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Abstract: The information that we see on the internet is increasingly tailored by automated ranking and filtering algorithms used 
by online platforms, which significantly interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights online, particularly the freedom of 
expression and information. The EU‟s regulation of the internet prohibits general monitoring obligations. The paper first analyses 
the CJEU‟s case law which has long resisted attempts to require internet intermediaries to use automated software filters to 
remove infringing user uploads. This is followed by an analysis of article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market, which effectively requires online platforms to use automated filtering to ensure the unavailability of unauthorized 
copyrighted content. The Commission‟s guidance and the AG‟s opinion in the annulment action are discussed. The conclusion is 
that the regulation of the filtering algorithms themselves will be necessary to prevent private censorship and protect fundamental 
rights online. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF ALGORITHMS ONLINE 
 
Algorithmic software tools increasingly tailor our online experience and thus 
shape our view of the world. Google‟s search algorithm was the key to its quick rise and 
eventual dominance over other search engines as it allowed its users to find the most 
relevant results on the web in a fraction of a second. If a piece of information published 
online is not indexed by Google‟s bots or has a low ranking in the presentation of 
Google‟s search results it will be effectively invisible to a vast majority of internet users. 
Algorithmic ranking and recommender systems play an essential role in social networks 
where they determine which posts will be displayed in a user‟s news feed, usually based 
on the user‟s interests and previous interactions (Llansó 2020, 1). All done to attract the 
user‟s attention, encourage the sharing of posts, and increase the time spent on the 
network and thus advertising opportunities. By playing on human psychology, 
algorithms close users into opinion bubbles where users are exposed only to 
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information confirming their pre-existing beliefs and in which hate speech and other 
harmful content can flourish as is most likely to be shared and liked. 
Online advertising, controlled to a large part by Facebook and Google, is also 
based on algorithms following the consumer‟s preferences. Online shops will use 
algorithms to present goods that the user browsing their website is most likely to 
purchase (e.g., based on their browsing history, clicks, and previous purchases). Finally, 
algorithms are also used to select the information that users will be prevented from 
seeing. Online forums, reader comment sections, and social networks employ 
algorithmic tools to filter out profanities, ethnic slurs, insulting language, etc., from their 
user‟s posts (Krönke 2020, 147). Online video platforms utilize similar systems (such as 
YouTube‟s Content ID) to identify and take down copyrighted content that was posted 
without authorization by copyright owners. Of course, the use of filtering algorithms can 
go much further and be (mis)used for political purposes. China is well known for 
blocking from its internet users any information that may be seen as critical to its 
political system or its leaders. 
The word algorithm is used here as a catchall for any set of computer-
implementable instructions used to sort, rank, and filter information: from simple 
computer programs searching for specific pre-defined expressions to advanced artificial 
intelligence (AI) systems that can process large data sets to achieve goals used in 
automated applications (Wischmeyer, Rademacher 2020, vii). Since the internet is now 
the basic information substructure of modern society, any technology that selects or 
limits access to information online may interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights 
online, particularly the freedom of expression and information guaranteed by article 11 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
The adoption of two major pieces of legislation in this connection is currently 
underway in the European Union. The draft Digital Services Act (COM(2020) 825 final), 
proposed by the European Commission in December 2020, will require very large online 
platforms to implement specific measures to mitigate systemic risks, such as the 
spreading of harmful disinformation. It is hard to conceive how to do that apart from 
relying on algorithmic tools for content moderation or recommendation. The draft 
Artificial Intelligence Act (COM(2021) 206 final), proposed in April 2021, will lay down 
harmonized rules for the use of AI systems, including the prohibition of certain AI 
practices and transparency rules for AI systems. However, these are future legislative 
acts the precise content of which is not yet certain. This paper will focus on the rules 
governing a specific set of algorithmic online filters the use of which is (indirectly) 
mandated by the Directive (EU) 2019/790 on Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
(DSM Directive), which entered into force in 2019 and requires online platforms to make 
best efforts to ensure the unavailability of unauthorized copyright works uploaded by 
their users. 
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PROHIBITION OF GENERAL MONITORING OBLIGATIONS 
 
To protect the nascent internet intermediary industry from excessive legal risks 
arising from potential liability for any illegal information transmitted or stored by the 
users of their services, the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) introduced a haven for 
online intermediaries in 2000. The providers of mere conduit and cashing were exempt 
from liability as long as they provide the services in a technically correct manner and do 
not in any way tamper with the information transmitted or stored. Hosting, however, is a 
wider category of online services consisting of longer-term storage of information 
provided by the recipient of the service. Apart from the hosting of websites and blogs, 
this includes social networks, online video and music platforms, online marketplaces, 
cloud computing services, etc. Since hosting providers have greater technical 
possibilities of reviewing and removing the hosted information, they were exempt from 
the liability in exchange for cooperation in removing any illegally hosted content once 
notified about the illegality under the notice-and-takedown system (Edwards 2009, 65). 
As long as the internet intermediary service remains “of a mere technical, 
automatic and passive nature” (recital 42), its provider is not required to check the 
legality of the information transmitted or stored, or to actively search for any unlawful 
content. The E-Commerce Directive reinforces this principle by expressly prohibiting the 
Member States from imposing on intermediary service providers any general obligation 
to monitor the information which they transmit or store, or any general obligation 
actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity (article 15). Member 
States may only require service providers to inform the competent public authorities of 
alleged illegal activities by their users. The prohibition of imposing general monitoring 
obligations has been an essential tenet of the EU‟s internet regulation for more than 
twenty years. As the only feasible manner of sifting through the mounds of data 
uploaded daily by the users of social networks and other online platforms is by using 
automated algorithmic tools, this rule effectively banned the Member States from 
prescribing the use of such filters. Service providers, however, are free to use sorting, 
ranking, recommending, and filtering algorithms for their business purposes if they 
choose so. 
Whereas article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive bans the imposition of general 
monitoring obligations, article 14(3) allows national courts or competent administrative 
authorities to order the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement in 
specific cases. On this basis, intellectual property rights holders have pushed to achieve 
court-ordered monitoring obligations aimed at specific service providers. The Member 
States‟ courts did not offer a uniform answer to the question of whether it is permissible 
for a court to order an internet agent to filter potentially infringing user content. In 
cases Atari Europe and GEMA v. Rapidshare, the German Federal Court held that a 
diligent hosting provider should set up a system of automated filtering of infringing 
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content after they have received notifications that the use of the hosting services 
violates the rights of third parties. 
The EU Court of Justice (CJEU) did not follow this reasoning. The case Scarlet 
Extended (C-70/10) concerned the question of whether an internet access provider 
could be ordered to filter all data traffic preventively to prevent illegal transfers of 
copyrighted content. At the suggestion of the collective organization Sabam, a Belgian 
court ordered the internet access provider to set up a system that would prevent its 
customers from transferring music files using peer-to-peer software. The CJEU held that 
such an order infringed the prohibition of general monitoring obligations and would 
disproportionately interfere with the freedom of economic initiative of the provider 
concerned. Traffic filtering would also violate the fundamental rights of users, namely 
the right to the protection of personal data and the freedom to receive and impart 
information. If the filter did not distinguish illegal content from legal content well 
enough, its use would make it impossible to download some legal content, which is 
unacceptable (Edwards 2009, 81). 
The CJEU adopted similar reasoning in the case SABAM v Netlog (C-360/10) 
which concerned the social network Netlog, whose users shared on their profiles 
copyrighted music and audio-visual works from the catalog of the music collective 
organization Sabam. The collecting society requested that the operator of the online 
platform be ordered to prevent such unlawful use of copyrighted works. A Belgian court 
asked the CJEU whether it was permissible to order a hosting provider to set up a 
preventive system of filtering all information stored by the users to identify the works 
managed by Sabam and to prevent the unauthorized sharing of these works. The CJEU 
reiterated its view that the automatic filtering system would seriously infringe the service 
provider's freedoms of economic initiative while disproportionately interfering with 
users' rights to the protection of personal data and the freedom to receive and impart 
information. Accordingly, it held that the court should not order a hosting provider to 
establish a preventive system for filtering all user data. 
Thus, it is an established position under the E-Commerce Directive that the duty 
of care cannot be interpreted in a way as to require intermediary service providers to set 
up an automated (algorithmic) system of filtering of any potentially illegal information 
uploaded or transmitted by their users. The article 14 requirement of the intermediary‟s 
actual knowledge or awareness of the unlawful information does not encompass any 
knowledge that the intermediary could obtain solely upon monitoring the hosted 
contents (Rowland, Kohl, Charlesworth 2012, 87). This applies even in cases of social 
networks and other mass platforms where it can be expected that a considerable share 
of user-uploaded content will infringe a copyright or other exclusive rights. 
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MOVE TOWARDS AUTOMATED CONTENT RECOGNITION IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
Controversial Adoption of the DSM Directive 
 
In the two decades since the adoption of the E-Commerce Directive, the role and 
influence of the main online platforms have grown immensely. Unlike vulnerable 
internet upstarts of the early 2000s, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter or YouTube are now 
internet giants generating vast advertising revenue at least indirectly derived from 
making available (unauthorized) copyrighted content uploaded by their users (Krönke 
2020, 161). This situation has been met with increasing dissatisfaction by copyright 
holders as it both disturbed traditional channels for the distribution of copyrighted 
works as well as stymied the development of new paid online channels. The rightholders 
have pointed out that the technically neutral role of social networks and other 
interactive online platforms is questionable since their operators actively encourage 
users to publish and share their content, which generates high web traffic (Murray 2010, 
107; Rowland, Kohl, Charlesworth 2012, 89). Since providing access to user-uploaded 
content is an essential part of the platform operator‟s business model, copyright holders 
increasingly demanded that the operators take a more active role in preventing 
copyright infringements. 
The specific protection of copyright in online platforms was addressed in the 
DSM Directive, adopted in April 2019 after two years of tumultuous debate in which one 
of the most contentious issues was whether to mandate the use of automated upload 
filters to reduce the amount of copyright-infringing content uploaded on social 
networks. Article 13 of the initial Commissions proposal for a new directive (COM(2016) 
593 final) required information society service providers who store and provide to the 
public access to large amounts of copyrighted content uploaded by their users to take 
measures to prevent the availability on their services of such content identified by 
rightholders. As an example of such measures, the Commission‟s proposal expressly 
mentioned the use of effective content recognition technologies, stressing that their use 
must be appropriate and proportionate. The use of content recognition technologies 
was also referred to in recital 39 of the proposal. 
Prescribing the use of content recognition technologies (also referred to as 
upload filters) seems to go against the prohibition of general monitoring obligations 
from the E-Commerce Directive, which would lead to a significant overhaul of the EU‟s 
online liability rules. Whereas the publishers‟ and copyright holders‟ associations were 
generally supportive of the proposed solution, IT companies (including the internet 
giants) and many academics were firmly opposed. Critics have pointed out that 
algorithm-based automatic filtering is technically relatively inefficient. Experience with 
the use of algorithm-based automatic filtering tools (e.g., on YouTube) has shown that 
they are not very reliable even in the relatively simple task of recognizing copyrighted 
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content based on a digital fingerprint, let alone in considering the various limitations 
and exceptions to copyright. An additional concern is that the costs of operating 
filtering mechanisms may stifle small independent online platforms and thus increase 
the existing oligopoly of internet giants, most of them located outside the EU.  
 
Article 17: Shadow Regulation? 
 
After the discussion of several drafts of the contentions provisions in the 
European Parliament, the EU‟s legislative process resulted in today‟s article 17 of the 
DSM Directive, which tightens the liability rules of a new sub-category of online 
intermediaries: online content-sharing service (OCSS) providers. These are hosting 
providers whose main task is to store and give the public access to a large amount of 
copyrighted content uploaded by its users, which the service provider organizes and 
promotes for profit-making purposes. 
When an OCSS provider gives the public access to copyrighted content uploaded 
by its users, this qualifies an act of communication to the public or an act of making 
available to the public by the service provider itself. This means that the service provider 
must obtain appropriate authorization for such use by the copyright holders, for 
instance by concluding a licensing agreement. Content-sharing platforms can no longer 
avoid liability for copyright infringements only by responding to takedown notices but 
must demonstrate that they have made best efforts to obtain authorization or, failing 
that, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of the unauthorized copyrighted content. 
OCSS providers must also make best efforts to prevent any future upload of the 
infringing content already removed upon receiving a takedown notice (Spindler 2020, 
139). 
The DSM Directive states that the application of article 17 should not lead to any 
general monitoring obligation, but due to the enormous amount of users‟ posts on 
content-sharing platforms it is hardly conceivable how the removal of all illegal content 
and the prevention of its future uploads could be achieved otherwise than by using 
automated filtering tools (Solmecke, Herr 2019; Spindler 2020, 16). Hence, although the 
Directive‟s provisions do not expressly mention content recognition technologies, they 
indirectly mandate their use, which is often referred to as shadow regulation. The 
conditions for the use of content recognition algorithms should be defined by the 
guidance provided by the European Commission and through the high industry 
standards referred to in article 17. Due to the potential conflict with human rights, the 
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The Commission‟s Guidance 
 
The suspicion that automated algorithmic content recognition will be the 
preferred, even if not legally mandated manner of complying with the content-sharing 
platform‟s best-efforts obligation under the DSM Directive was confirmed by the 
Commission‟s Guidance on article 17 (COM(2021) 288 final), issued in June 2021. The 
document stresses that the best-efforts provision should be implemented in a 
technologically neutral manner so that OCSS providers are free to choose the solution 
to comply with their obligations. However, the Commission also points out that the 
stakeholder dialogue showed that content recognition technology is commonly used 
today to manage the use of copyrighted content, even if it cannot be considered as the 
market standard for smaller service providers. The assessment of whether an OCSS 
provider has made its best efforts concerning specific protected content should be 
made on a case-by-case basis, according to the proportionality principle, considering 
the type, size, and audience of the service; the availability of suitable and effective 
means and the related costs; and the type of content uploaded by users. 
The Commission‟s guidance resembles the CJEU‟s reasoning in joined cases 
YouTube and Cyando (C-682/18 and C-683/18), which was decided based on liability 
rules from the E-Commerce Directive, but after the adoption of the DSM Directive. The 
court assessed whether the video hosting platforms have taken „credible and effective 
measures to counter copyright infringements after having been notified by the 
rightholder of specific violations. From the enumeration of various technical measures 
that might be considered sufficient in this regard, one can conclude that the CJEU does 
not consider upload filters as the only appropriate technological measure to prevent 
illegal uploads (Reda, Selinger 2021). The court also stressed that considering the 
particular importance of the internet to freedom of expression and information, a fair 
balance must be sought between, on the one hand, the protection of the intellectual 
property right and, on the other, the right to freedom to conduct a business enjoyed by 
service providers and the right to freedom of expression and information enjoyed by 
internet users (paras 65 and 138). 
 
Poland‟s Action for the Annulment of Article 17 
 
The ECJ is expected to provide further guidance on the acceptability of 
algorithmic content filtering when deciding on the action for the annulment of article 17 
of the Directive lodged by Poland (C-401/19). Poland claims that the imposition of the 
obligation to make best efforts to ensure the unavailability and future uploads of 
infringing content require in effect that OCSS providers carry out prior automatic 
filtering of content uploaded online by users. Such preventive control mechanisms 
undermine the essence of the right to freedom of expression and information and do 
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not comply with the requirement that limitations imposed on that right be proportional 
and necessary. Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe concluded in his opinion 
delivered on 15 July 2021 that OCSS providers are under an obligation to engage in 
preventative monitoring; however, that obligation is specific, not general. The AG 
conceded that the contested provisions of the directive might indirectly force OCSS 
providers to use content recognition tools to filter the user-uploaded content, 
particularly where its employees would not be able to check all or most of the uploads. 
This obligation interferes with freedom of expression and information but remains 
compatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In AG‟s understanding, OCSS 
providers are not authorized preventively to block all content that reproduces the 
copyrighted works but must block only manifestly infringing content. Conversely, in all 
ambiguous situations where exceptions and limitations to copyright might apply (e.g., 
short extracts or transformative works) the content concerned cannot be the subject of a 
preventive blocking measure since this could cause irreparable damage to freedom of 
expression (Rosati 2021). 
 
Further Conflict of Automated Filtering with Fundamental Rights 
 
In AG Saugmandsgaard Øe‟s opinion, any filtering algorithms under DSM 
Directive should be able to protect the fundamental rights exercised through the various 
limitations and exceptions to copyright prescribed by the Member States in cases where 
reasons of a public interest override the rightsholders‟ interests and refrain from 
blocking such non-infringing content. This seems optimistic considering the current 
technical level of content-recognition algorithms which are mainly limited to identifying 
content identical to the provided sample and often fail even at that task (Dawson 2018). 
It remains to be seen whether the more advanced algorithms will be able to recognize 
effectively the highly contextual instances where such exceptions and limitations might 
apply (such as parody, quotation, or incidental inclusion). Romero Moreno proposes that 
upload filters should be targeted specifically at copyright infringement on a commercial 
scale, which are more easily recognizable, ensuring the proportionality of the measure 
(Romero Moreno 2020, 164). 
The problem will be further exacerbated if the statutory requirements for 
automated filtering are eventually expanded to other types of illegal content, such as 
terrorist materials, hate speech, child pornography, etc., where the recognition of illegal 
information and the protection of lawful communication might be even more difficult. 
Perhaps the rapid development of AI-based software tools will increase the ability 
of automated contextual recognition of infringing versus non-infringing content. 
However, AI-based algorithms carry with them the black box problem: their content 
policies are difficult to understand and, due to their self-learning features, the precise 
criteria they use to identify, select, or classify information are constantly evolving and 
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may not be well understood even by the operators themselves (Wischmeyer 2020, 77). 
This makes it difficult any effective ex post judicial control over content filtering, whereas 
ex ante procedural hurdle to censorship is completely removed by automation (Llansó 
2020, 3-4). 
Even if the content filtering algorithms perform perfectly, however, the setting up 
of technical infrastructure for permanent monitoring of all internet content is 
dangerous. Free internet is an essential information infrastructure of modern society. 
The practice of scanning all online content for any possible illegalities is eerily similar to 
the manners of totalitarian states and the suspicion will linger that filtering algorithms 
could be misused for political or for commercial purposes. Hence the warning of the 
internet pioneers that the DSM directive takes an unprecedented step towards the 
transformation of the internet from an open platform for sharing and innovation into a 




The use of content recognition and other content sorting algorithms online is a 
reality that will not go away, regardless of the law. Evermore complex algorithms will be 
used to sort out the ever-increasing amounts of information. This is increasingly 
recognized by the CJEU‟s case law and in the EU‟s legislation, although both remain 
based on the principle of prohibition of general monitoring obligations. To protect the 
exercise of fundamental rights online, the operation of the algorithms will have to be 
regulated, and copyright law is just the first field where such attempts have been made 
in legislation. However, the regulation of filtering algorithms should not simply amount 
to delegating the task of censoring the internet to private service providers who are 
then free to determine themselves what information they will block (Institut Suisse 2017, 
17-22). The intermediaries‟ neutral role in handling users‟ data is essential to preserve 
the internet‟s role as a public information infrastructure rather than just an offering of 
commercial electronic services completely within their provider‟s ambit and 
responsibility. To ensure democratic control of the internet, the operation of algorithms 
should be transparent, including transparency into what elements of the underlying data 
were important in developing the classifier of an algorithm (Llansó 2020, 5). The draft 
Artificial Intelligence Act contains transparency obligations for certain AI systems, but 
these would not apply to the content-filtering algorithms discussed here as they do not 
directly interact with humans, use biometric data or generate or manipulate content. 
Rather than using shadow regulation, the copyright legislation should expressly regulate 
the filtering algorithms used on content-sharing platforms and require their 
transparency. This would also allow the courts to preserve their role of assessing 
whether the measures strike a balance between the fundamental rights.  
 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Volume 7 · Number 3 · Supp. 1 · 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 45 






The author‟s research for this article was supported by the Slovenian Research Agency 
(ARRS) under the research program P5-0337 “Legal challenges of the information 
society” and the research project J5-3107 “The development and use of artificial 
intelligence in the light of negative and positive obligations of a State to ensure the 
right to life”. 
 
Statement of human rights:  
This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed by any of 
the authors. 
 
Statement on the welfare of animals:  
This article does not contain any studies with animals performed by any of the authors. 
 





















Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Volume 7 · Number 3 · Supp. 1 · 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 




1. Cerf, Vint, et al. 2018 “Article 13 of the EU Copyright Directive Threatens the 
Internet, letter to the President of the European Parliament”, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 12 June. https://www.eff.org/files/2018/06/12/article13letter.pdf 
2. Dawson, Aimee. 2018.“Facebook censors 30,000-year-old Venus of Willendorf as 
'pornographic'.”The Art Newspaper, 27. February. 
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/facebook-censors-famous-30-000-year-
old-nude-statue-as-pornographic 
3. Edwards, Lilian. 2009. “The Fall and Rise of Intermediary Liability Online.” In Law 
and the Internet, edited by Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing. 
4. Institut suisse de droit compare. 2017.Comparative Study on Blocking, Filtering, 
and Takedown of Illegal Internet Content. Lausanne: Council of Europe. 
5. Llansó, Emma J. 2020. “No Amount of „AI‟ in Content Moderation Will Solve 
Filtering‟s Prior-Restraint Problem.” Big Data & Society, 7:1-6. 
6. Murray, Andrew. 2010.Information Technology Law: The law and society. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
7. Reda, Julia, and Joschka Selinger. 2021. “YouTube/Cyando – an Important Ruling 
for Platform Liability – Part 1.” Kluwer Copyright Blog, 1 July, 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/07/01/youtube-cyando-an-
important-ruling-for-platform-liability-part-1. 
8. Romero Moreno, Felipe. 2020 “Upload filters and human rights: implementing 
Article 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market.” International 
Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 34:2, 153-182. 
9. Rosati, Eleonora. 2021. “AG Øe advises CJEU to rule that Article 17 is COMPATIBLE 
with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and should not be annulled 
Thursday.” TheIPKat, 15 July. https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2021/07/ag-e-
advises-cjeu-to-rule-that-article.html. 
10. Rowland, Diane, Uta Kohl, and Andrew Charlesworth. 2012. Information 
technology law. 4th edition. London, New York: Routledge. 
11. Solmecke, Christian, and Anne-Christine Herr. 2019.“Rechtliche Analyse der Pro- 
und Contra Argumente zu Artikel 13 der geplanten EU Urheberrechtsnovelle.” 
Wilde Beuger Solmecke Rechtsanwälte, 19 March. https://www.wbs-law.de/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Analyse-Artikel-13-Version-1.2-WILDE-BEUGER-
SOLMECKE-Rechtsanw%C3%A4lte.pdf. 
12. Spindler, Gerald. 2020.“Copyright Law and Internet Intermediaries Liability.” In EU 
Internet Law in the Digital Era: Regulation and Enforcement, edited by Tatiana-
Eleni Synodinou et al.Cham: Springer Nature. 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Volume 7 · Number 3 · Supp. 1 · 2021 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com      
     
 
                                            
 47 
13. Wischmeyer, Thomas and Timo Rademacher. 2020. “Preface: Good Artificial 
Intelligence.” In Regulating Artificial Intelligence, edited by Thomas Wischmeyer 
and Timo Rademacher. Cham: Springer.  
14. Wischmeyer, Thomas. 2020. “Artificial Intelligence and Transparency: Opening the 
Black Box.” In Regulating Artificial Intelligence, edited by Thomas Wischmeyer 
and Timo Rademacher. Cham: Springer. 
15. Krönke, Christoph. 2020. “Artificial Intelligence and Social Media.” In Regulating 
Artificial Intelligence, edited by Thomas Wischmeyer and Timo Rademacher. 
Cham: Springer. 
 
